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Abstract
In this paper we deal with linear production situations in which there
is a limited common-pool resource, managed by an external agent. The
profit that a producer, or a group of producers, can attain depends on the
amount of common-pool resource obtained through a certain procedure.
We contemplate a competitive process among the producers or groups of
producers and study the corresponding non cooperative games, describing
their (strict) Nash equilibria in pure strategies. It is shown that strict Nash
equilibria form a subset of strong Nash equilibria, which in turn form a
proper subset of Nash equilibria
AMS classification: 90B30, 91A10.
JEL Classification: C72.
Keywords: linear production situations, common-pool resource, Nash
equilibrium
1 Introduction
Linear production (LP ) situations and corresponding cooperative games were
introduced in Owen (1975). These are situations where a set of producers own
resource bundles that they can use to produce several products through linear
production techniques. Their goal is to maximize the profit, which equals the
revenue of their products at the given market prices. Tijs et al. (2001) study
more general LP situations involving a countably infinite number of products.
In this paper we deal with linear production situations in which there is a
limited common-pool resource (LPP ), controlled by an external agent and it
∗Corresponding author, e-mail: joaquin@umh.es
1
is necessary to produce any product. The motivation to study such a situation
is due to the fact that it arises in many real-life situations related to natural
resource management such as when the producers need to buy carbon dioxide,
water or fish quotas or even to obtain public capital to invest in their firms.
This type of situation was recently introduced by Gutie´rrez et al. (2015). The
profit that a producer, or a group of producers, can attain depends on the
amount of common-pool resource obtained through a certain procedure. In
Gutie´rrez et al. (2015) they consider a collaborative approach to this process.
In this paper we contemplate a competitive process among the producers or
groups of producers. Depending on the procedure used to obtain the amount of
common-pool resource that they need, different games can be defined. In the
case of a cooperative process, Gutie´rrez et al. (2015) show that these games are
partition function form games. They prove that if the common-pool resource
is not a constraint for the production process, or it is only a restriction for the
grand coalition, then the games reduce to characteristic function games and the
games obtained in the former case have a non empty core. In the more general
case, when the common-pool resource could be a constraint for the production
process, the problem can be modeled as a bankruptcy-like problem. Then, the
manager of the common-pool resource can apply bankruptcy rules in order to
share this. Bankruptcy techniques have been widely used to deal with scarce
resources in many economic problems such as k-hop minimum cost spanning
tree problems (Bergantin˜os et al, 2012).
In the present work, we consider a competitive process as a mechanism for
the producers, or groups of producers, to obtain their share of the common-pool
resource. This can be modeled as a non cooperative game among coalitions and
we study the existence of Nash equilibria, and some of its refinements, in pure
strategies for such a game.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 some concepts on linear pro-
duction situations with a common-pool resource are presented. In Section 3 we
assume that the producers will take part in a competitive process to distribute
the common-pool resource. Thus, we study the corresponding non cooperative
games, describing their (strict) Nash equilibria, Nash (1950), in pure strate-
gies. Moreover, all strict Nash equilibria turn out to be strong Nash equilibria,
Aumann (1959). Section 4 concludes.
2 On linear production situations with a common-
pool resource
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of producers that have to deal with a linear produc-
tion problem to produce a set G = {1, . . . , g} of goods from a set Q = {1, . . . , q}
of resources. There exists an external agent, called the pool, who has an amount
r of a certain resource that agents need to buy for producing the goods. The
model is described by:
• bi ∈ Rq+ are the available resources for each producer i ∈ N , b
S =
∑
i∈S b
i.
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B ∈ Mq×n is the resource matrix. We assume that there is a positive
quantity of each resource, i.e. for all resources t ∈ Q there is a producer i
such that bti > 0.
• R represents the common-pool resource, owned by the pool, whose cost
per unit, cR, is fixed (exogenously determined) and the total available is
denoted by r.
• A ∈M(q+1)×g is the production matrix, atj is the amount of the resource
t needed to produce the product j, where the last row is related to the
pool-resource and a(q+1)j > 0 ∀ j ∈ G. Furthermore, we do not allow for
output without input and, therefore, for each product j ∈ G there is at
least one resource t ∈ Q with atj > 0.
• p ∈ Rg++ is the price vector. Moreover, in order to face a profitable process
we assume that pj > a(q+1)jcR ∀ j ∈ G.
Thus, a linear production situation with a common-pool resource (LPP )
can be denoted by (A,B, p, r, cR) .
The producers can join in groups (coalitions) for the production process,
because they can use the same set of productions techniques, and for buying
the common-pool resource.
P(N) represents the set of all partitions of N and P = {S1, . . . , Sk} denotes
one of these partitions. PS(N) is the set of all partitions of N that contain S
and PS is an element of PS(N). The profit that a coalition S ⊆ N can obtain
depends on the coalitions formed by the other players PS ∈ PS(N) and on what
those coalitions do.
We denote by value (S; z) the value of the linear program:
max
∑g
j=1 pjxj − cRz
s.t: Ax ≤
(
bS
z
)
x ≥ 0g, z ≥ 0,
(1)
where bS =
∑
i∈S
bi. The optimal demand of the common-pool resource for each
coalition S, dS = min {z ∈ R+ |value (S; z) is maximum} , is obtained by solv-
ing the linear program (1). Given a partition P = {S1, . . . , Sk}, its total demand
is d(P ) =
∑k
i=1 dSi . One might think that the optimal demands are superad-
ditive, i. e. dS ≥
∑
i∈S d{i}, however, Gutie´rrez et al. (2015) show that this
is not true. We assume that for all S, there is a feasible production plan (x; z)
such that value (S; z) > 0, which implies dS > 0.
3 A non cooperative game among coalitions
In this section we study the competitive procedure in which the producers take
part in order to obtain their share of the common-pool resource.
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Let P = {S1, ..., Sk} be a partition of N and dSi the demand of the common-
pool resource for each group of producers Si ∈ P . The coalitions in P proceed
to buy, simultaneously, the common-pool resource that they need. A problem
arises when the common-pool resource is scarce. In such a situation the coali-
tions in P act non cooperatively and try to maximize the amount of common-
pool resource. This can be modeled as a non cooperative game among coali-
tions. To this end, a mechanism of a competitive game where players can be
alone or in groups (coalitions) is designed; this takes into account that if they
ask for more, in total, than the available amount of the common-pool resource,
then the manager (pool) gives them nothing. This can be read as a kind of
penalty that the owner of the common-pool resource (carbon dioxide, water or
fish quotas) imposes on the producers in order to reach an agreement on a sus-
tainable exploitation of the resource. In this way he forces the self-regulation
of the producers. It can be done through other techniques such as dealing with
bankruptcy problems as in Gutie´rrez et al. (2015).
More formally, assume that each coalition Si ∈ P chooses an amount zi of
the common-pool resource to buy, i.e. its set of strategies is Xi = [0, dSi] and
its profit is given by
pii (z1, ..., zk) =
{
0, if
∑k
i=1 zi > r
value (Si; zi) , otherwise.
We denote by (X1, ..., Xk;pi1, ..., pik) the non cooperative game played by
coalitions in P when they try to obtain the highest amount of the common-pool
resource. The concept of equilibrium as defined by Nash (1950) and its refine-
ments are the most widely used solution concepts in non cooperative games.
Definition 1 Let P = {S1, ..., Sk} be a partition of N , z
∗ ∈
k∏
i=1
Xi is a Nash
equilibrium (NE) in pure strategies of the non cooperative game (X1, ..., Xk;pi1, ..., pik)
if for all i ∈ {1, .., k}
pii
(
z∗1 , ..., z
∗
i−1, z
∗
i , z
∗
i+1, ...z
∗
k
)
≥ pii
(
z∗1 , ..., z
∗
i−1, zi, z
∗
i+1, ...z
∗
k
)
,
for all zi ∈ Xi.
Definition 2 Let P = {S1, ..., Sk} be a partition of N , z
∗ ∈
k∏
i=1
Xi is a strict
Nash equilibrium (sNE) in pure strategies of the non cooperative game (X1, ..., Xk;pi1, ..., pik)
if for all i ∈ {1, .., k}
pii
(
z∗1 , ..., z
∗
i−1, z
∗
i , z
∗
i+1, ...z
∗
k
)
> pii
(
z∗1 , ..., z
∗
i−1, zi, z
∗
i+1, ...z
∗
k
)
,
for all zi ∈ Xi \ {z
∗
i }.
Aumann (1959) proposed the idea of strong Nash equilibrium (SNE), defined
as a strategic profile for which no subset of players has a joint deviation that
strictly benefits all of them, while all other players maintain their equilibrium
strategies.
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Definition 3 Let P = {S1, ..., Sk} be a partition of N , z
∗ ∈
k∏
i=1
Xi is a strong
Nash equilibrium (SNE) in pure strategies of the non cooperative game (X1, ..., Xk;pi1, ..., pik)
if for all M ⊂ P there does not exist any zM ∈ XM such that
pii
(
zM , z
∗
−M
)
> pii (z
∗) , ∀i ∈M,
where XM =
∏
i∈M
Xi.
Firstly, we study the less controversial case, when the common-pool resource
is sufficient to meet demands.
Theorem 4 Let P = {S1, ..., Sk} be a partition of N , (dS1 , ..., dSk) is the only
Nash equilibrium of the non cooperative game (X1, ..., Xk;pi1, ..., pik) if and only
if d(P ) ≤ r.
Proof. First, we prove the sufficient part. Let P = {S1, . . . , Sk} be a par-
tition of N such that d(P ) ≤ r. Then, by the definition of dSi , it holds
pii(dS1 , . . . , dSk) = value (Si; dSi) ≥ value (Si; z) = pii(dS1 , . . . , dSi−1 , zi, dSi+1 , . . . , dSk)
for all zi ≤ dSi , and so (dS1 , ..., dSk) is a Nash equilibrium.
Let us assume that there is another Nash equilibrium (z1, ..., zk). Thus,
there is at least one i such that zi < dSi , but from the definition we know
that dSi = min {z ∈ R+ : value (Si; z) is maximum}. Therefore, we have that
value (Si; zi) < value (Si; dSi), which contradicts the fact that (z1, ..., zk) is a
Nash equilibrium.
Next, we prove the necessary part. Let (dS1 , ..., dSk) be the unique Nash
equilibrium. Let us assume that d(P ) > r. This implies pii (dS1 , ..., dSk) =
0, ∀i ∈ {1, .., k}. We will distinguish three possible situations:
1.
∑
i6=j dSi > r, ∀j ∈ {1, .., k}.
Let ε > 0 be such that ε ≤ minj∈{1,..,k}
{∑
i6=j dSi
}
and (k − 1) ε <
minj∈{1,..,k}
{∑
i6=j dSi − r
}
. Then, (dS1 − ε, ..., dSk − ε) is also a Nash
equilibrium. Namely, pii (dS1 − ε, ..., dSk − ε) = 0, ∀i ∈ {1, .., k}. On the
other hand,
∑
i6=j (dSi − ε) =
∑
i6=j dSi− (k − 1) ε > r, ∀j ∈ {1, .., k}.
Therefore, for all i ∈ {1, .., k}, it holds
0 = pii
(
dS1 − ε, ..., dSj − ε, ..., dSk − ε
)
≥ pii (dS1 − ε, ..., zi, ..., dSk − ε) = 0,
∀zi ∈ [0, dSi ] . Then, this contradicts the uniqueness of the Nash equilib-
rium.
2. ∃j ∈ {1, .., k} such that
∑
i6=j dSi < r.
We can choose zj ≤ r −
∑
i6=j dSi such that value (Sj ; zj) > 0, since we
know by hypothesis that there are positive profits. Now, for (dS1 , ..., zj, ..., dSk)
we have that
value (Sj ; zj) = pij (dS1 , ..., zj, ..., dSk) > pij (dS1 , ..., dSi , ..., dSk) ,
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which is a contradiction because (dS1 , ..., dSk) is a Nash equilibrium by
hypothesis.
3. ∄j ∈ {1, .., k} such that
∑
j 6=i dSj < r.
All the above implies that
∑
i6=j dSi ≥ r ,∀j ∈ {1, .., k} with at least one
equality in these expressions, because otherwise we would be in case 1 and
this is impossible.
Let us assume that for j we have
∑
i6=j dSi = r. Then,

dS1 , ..., 0︸︷︷︸
j
, ..., dSk


is a Nash equilibrium since
0 = pij

dS1 , ..., 0︸︷︷︸
j
, ..., dSk

 ≥ pij (dS1 , ..., zj, ..., dSk) = 0,∀zj ∈ [0, dSj ] ,
since
∑
i6=j dSi + zj > r, ∀zj > 0.
Likewise, for all i 6= j we know that, ∀zi ∈ [0, dSi ] ,
pii

dS1 , ..., 0︸︷︷︸
j
, ..., dSk

 = value(Si; dSi) ≥
value(Si; zi) = pii

dS1 , ..., zi, ..., 0︸︷︷︸
j
, ..., , dSk

 ,
by definition of dSi and
∑
i6=j dSi = r. But, this is a contradiction with
the uniqueness of (dS1 , ..., dSk) as a Nash equilibrium. 
The following result shows an analysis, in terms of Nash equilibria, when
the amount of the common-pool resource R is not enough to meet the demand
expectations of the players, which are grouped in different coalitions that form
a partition of the whole set. This covers all the possibilities that may appear in
these situations.
Theorem 5 Let P = {S1, ..., Sk} be a partition of N . If d(P ) > r, then the set
of all Nash equilibria is given by
NE (X1, ..., Xk;pi1, ..., pik) =


z ∈
k∏
i=1
[0, dSi ] :
k∑
i=1
zi = r, or∑
i6=j
zi > r, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., k} , or∑
i6=j
zi = r, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., k} , zi =
r
k−1 , zi ≤ dSi


.
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Proof. It easy to check that they are Nash equilibria. In the first case, we should
take into account that for z ∈
∏k
i=1 [0, dSi ] with
∑k
i=1 zi = r if zj , z
′
j ∈ [0, dSj ]
are such that z′j < zj , then value(Sj; z
′
j) ≤ value(Sj; zj). This result holds
because value
(
Sj ; z
′
j
)
< value
(
Sj; dSj
)
, due to the uniqueness of dSj , z
′
j < dSj
and zj = αz
′
j + (1− α)dSj with α > 0. Thus, value (Sj ; zj) ≥ αvalue
(
Sj ; z
′
j
)
+
(1−α)value
(
Sj ; dSj
)
> value
(
Sj ; z
′
j
)
. The remaining cases are obvious because
unilateral deviations do not produce any benefit. Let us see that they are the
complete list of all Nash equilibria. To this end, we will distinguish several
cases.
1. Let us assume that there is a Nash equilibrium z ∈
∏k
i=1 [0, dSi ] such that∑k
i=1 zi < r. Then, there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that zj < dSj , other-
wise zi = dSi , ∀i ∈ {1, ..., k} , and
∑k
i=1 zi =
∑k
i=1 dSi > r. Nevertheless,
in the former case, j has incentives to deviate and choose z′j > zj with
k∑
i6=j
zi + z
′
j ≤ r and z
′
j ≤ dSi , so it would not be a Nash equilibrium.
2. Let us assume that there is a Nash equilibrium z ∈
∏k
i=1 [0, dSi ] such that
k∑
i=1
zi > r. Let us note that, in this case pii(z) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
2.1 If there is a j ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that
∑
i6=j
zi < r, then if j deviates from
zj to r−
∑
i6=j
zi she will obtain an amount pij(z1, . . . , r−
∑
i6=j
zi, . . . , zk) =
value
(
Sj ; r −
∑
i6=j
zi
)
> 0. Therefore, z is not a Nash equilibrium.
2.2 If
∑
i6=j
zi = r, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., k}, then no j has incentive to deviate. Never-
theless, for all j ∈ {1, ..., k},
k∑
i=1
zi =
∑
i6=j
zi + zj = r + zj. If we add in
j
k
k∑
i=1
zi = kr +
k∑
j=1
zi ⇒
k∑
i=1
zi = r +
1
k
k∑
i=1
zi ⇒
zj =
1
k
k∑
i=1
zi = K, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., k} and K ∈ R⇒
r =
∑
i6=j
zi = (k − 1)K ⇒ K =
r
k−1 .
2.2.1 If there is i such that r
k−1 > dSi , then we have a contradiction
with zi ∈ [0, dSi ].
2.2.2 If for all i we have that r
k−1 ≤ dSi , then z is a Nash equilibrium.

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The next result illustrates which is the set of strict Nash equilibria, when
the amount of the common-pool resource R is not enough to meet the demand
expectations of the players.
Theorem 6 Let P = {S1, ..., Sk} be a partition of N . If d(P ) > r, then the set
of all strict Nash equilibria is given by
sNE (X1, ..., Xk;pi1, ..., pik) =
{
z ∈
k∏
i=1
[0, dSi ] :
k∑
i=1
zi = r and ∀i ∈ {1, ..., k} , zi > 0
}
.
(2)
Proof.
1. Every strategy vector in sNE (X1, ..., Xk;pi1, ..., pik) is obviously a Nash equi-
librium by Theorem 5, since
sNE (X1, ..., Xk;pi1, ..., pik) ⊆ NE (X1, ..., Xk;pi1, ..., pik) .
2. Every strategy vector in sNE (X1, ..., Xk;pi1, ..., pik) is a strict Nash equilib-
rium. We will distinguish two cases:
2.1 ∀z′i < zi we have that value (Si; z
′
i) < value (Si; zi). The result holds
because value (Si; z
′
i) < value (Si; dSi) due to the uniqueness of dSi ,
z′i < dSi and zi = αz
′
i+(1−α)dSi with α > 0. Thus, value (Si; zi) ≥
αvalue (Si; z
′
i) + (1− α)value (Si; dSi) > value (Si; z
′
i) .
2.2 ∀z′i > zi we know that
∑
j 6=i
zj + z
′
i > r, which implies piSi = 0 by
definition and value (Si; zi) > 0.
3. Let us assume that there is at least one strict Nash equilibria different to
those in (2). Then, from Theorem 5, we should consider several cases:
3.1
k∑
i=1
zi > r. By Theorem 5 we know that z is a Nash equilibrium. But,
obviously, it is not strict because pii = 0 by definition of the payoffs.
3.2
k∑
i=1
zi = r and there is at least a coalition Sj such that zj = 0. On
the one hand, we know from Theorem 5 that a Nash equilibrium
exists, on the other hand, we have that pij (zj) = 0 and pij
(
z′j
)
= 0,
∀z′j > zj . Therefore, this is a Nash equilibrium which is not strict. 
Additionally, all strict Nash equilibria in (2) are strong Nash equilibria.
Because following a similar reasoning as that used in the previous result, it is
not possible that several producers deviate together in such a way that all of
them are strictly better off. Furthermore, it is easy to check that z ∈
k∏
i=1
[0, dSi ]
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such that
k∑
i=1
zi = r with zj = 0, for some j ∈ {1, ..., k} , is a strong Nash
equilibrium which is not strict. Therefore, strict Nash equilibria form a proper
subset of strong Nash equilibria, which in turn form a proper subset of Nash
equilibria. Thus, we do not characterize the strong Nash equilibria because we
have described the strict Nash equilibria which are in a more restrictive class.
4 Concluding remarks
In view of these results we conclude that the set of possible outcomes is very
large. So, to decide whether we will find one or another is difficult. What
seems clear is that the fairest Nash equilibria and most advantageous for the
market are those that distribute the whole resource, when this is scarce, among
all participants.
We should point out that the coordination among coalitions is important
in order not to receive a zero amount of the common-pool resource. Another
possibility to deal with the situation where the players ask for more than the
available amount of the common-pool resource, is to use bankruptcy techniques
as in Gutie´rrez et al. (2015).
We have assumed throughout the paper that every producer knows the re-
sources of the others. We leave for further research the study, in terms of
Bayesian equilibria, when this is not the case. Moreover, we have considered
that the price of the common-pool resource is fixed, but we could explore the
case when it depends on its own demand. Furthermore, we would like to study
the auction problem that arises when the total amount of the common-pool
resource is auctioned among the coalitions in a partition, where each coalition
bids an amount to buy and a price to pay per unit of the common-pool resource
as the model of the electricity market described in Sancho et al. (2008).
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